# **Migration and inequality**

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## About me

### Post-doc at the International Inequalities Institute (LSE)

#### **Research topics:**

- ightarrow Intergenerational mobility
- ightarrow Socio-economic integration of children of immigrants
- $\rightarrow\,$  Determinants of intergenerational persistence

## Mostly **empirical research** on French administrative data

## **Today's lecture**

**Objective:** Describe the economic processes underlying the different stages of migration

- $\rightarrow\,$  Selection into migration
- $\rightarrow\,$  Effects on natives and on migrants themselves
- ightarrow What children inherit from parental migration

 $\Rightarrow$  (light) theory and empirical case studies

**References:** Inequality and Immigration (Dustmann et al., 2022) Labor Economics (Borjas and Van Ours, 2010)

## **Overview**

- 1. Orders of magnitude
- 2. Drivers of migration
- 3. Consequences for natives
- 4. Consequences for migrants themselves
- 5. Consequences for their children

# Orders of magnitude

#### 1. Share of immigrants in the world

3% - 8% - 11% - 16% - 21%

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3. Share of international migration flows that occur within continents

0% - ??? - 100%

1. Share of immigrants in the world

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2. Share of immigrants in Italy

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3. Share of international migration flows that occur within continents

0% - 57% - 100%

- 1. Share of immigrants in the world 3% - 8% - 11% - 16% - 21%
- 2. Share of immigrants in Italy 3% - 8% - 11% - 16% - 21%
- 3. Share of international migration flows that occur within continents

0% - 57% - 100%

4. Employment rate of immigrants in OECD countries

0% - ??? - 100%

- 1. Share of immigrants in the world 3% - 8% - 11% - 16% - 21%
- 2. Share of immigrants in Italy 3% - 8% - 11% - 16% - 21%
- 3. Share of international migration flows that occur within continents

0% - 57% - 100%

4. Employment rate of immigrants in OECD countries

0% - 72% - 100%

# Share of immigrants across countries



# Share of immigrants across countries (<50%)



# Migration flows between continents matrix



# Share of birth countries among immigrants in Italy 🚥



## Share of destination countries of Italian migrants 🚥



## **Overview**

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# **Drivers of migration**

# **Push and pull factors**

## **Push factors**

## Conflicts:

- Persecution
- War

## Natural disasters:

- Floods
- Drought

## **Pull factors**

## **Economic opportunities:**

- Higher wages
- Better living standards

## Personal ties:

- Family reunification
- Temporary to permanent

# Drivers of long-term/permanent migration to Italy



## Labor market outcomes



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## **The Roy Model**

Historical model to rationalize skilled vs. unskilled migration

- Originally designed by Roy (1951) to model two types of jobs
- Adapted by Borjas (1987) to model migration decision

Individual *i* would **migrate** from country *o* to *d* **if**:

$$y_d(s_i) - C_i > y_o(s_i)$$
, where:

 $y_j(s_i)$ : Income earned in country  $j \in \{o, d\}$  at skill level  $s_i$   $(y_j' > 0)$  $C_i$ : Cost of migration  $C_i = c + \varepsilon_i$ , where

c Homogeneous cost of migrating from o to d  $\varepsilon_i \sim N(0, 1)$  idiosyncratic cost of migration

## **Negative selection**

- Destination - Origin



**Positive selection** Destination - Origin \_\_\_\_ Wage

# **Vertical shift** Destination - Origin \_\_\_\_ Wage

# **Vertical shift** Destination - Origin \_\_\_\_ Wage

## **Extensions of the Roy model**

#### Intertemporal extension:

- $y_t^j$ : Income flow in country  $j \in \{o, d\}$  at time t
  - r: Discount rate of future income



#### **Other extensions:**

- Uncertainty about future earnings (Bellemare, 2007)
- Non-monetary preferences in  $\{o, d\}$  (Piyapromdee, 2021)
- Differences in purchasing power in  $\{o, d\}$  (Kırdar, 2013)
- HK investments and non-permanent migration (Adda et al., 2022)

## Case study: Puerto Rico (Borjas, 2008)



# **Historical context**

1898 End of the Spanish American War

 $\rightarrow~$  Puerto Rico became a possession of the United States

1917 The Jones Act grants US citizenship to Puerto Ricans  $\rightarrow\,$  Free mobility from Puerto Rico to the US

1945 High unemployment in post-WWII Puerto Rico Introduction of low-cost air travel

 $\rightarrow\,$  Triggered large out-migration from Puerto Rico to the US

## Data and method

#### U.S. Census

Education and earnings

 $\rightarrow\,$  Returns to skills in the U.S.

Place of birth

 $\rightarrow$  Migration P.R.  $\Rightarrow$  U.S.

#### P.R. Census

Education and earnings  $\rightarrow$  Returns to skills in P.R. Place of birth  $\rightarrow$  Migration from U.S.  $\Rightarrow$  P.R.

## Puerto Rican in-/out-migration rates

In-migration:  $\frac{US_{PR}}{US_{PR} + PR_{PR}}$  Out-migration:  $\frac{PR_{US}}{PR_{US} + PR_{PR}}$ 

## **Migration flows between Puerto Rico and the US**



## Returns to skills in Puerto Rico vs. the US

- Puerto Rico - United States



## What does the Roy model predict?

### Migration flows between the U.S. and Puerto Rico:

- 1. Bilateral flow of low-skilled
- 2. Low-skilled to Puerto Rico; High-skilled to the U.S.
- 3. Low-skilled to the U.S.; High-skilled to Puerto Rico
- 4. Bilateral flow of high-skilled

## What does the Roy model predict?

## Migration flows between the U.S. and Puerto Rico:

- 1. Bilateral flow of low-skilled **X**
- 2. Low-skilled to Puerto Rico; High-skilled to the U.S. X
- 3. Low-skilled to the U.S.; High-skilled to Puerto Rico  $\checkmark$
- 4. Bilateral flow of high-skilled **X**
## **Out-migration from Puerto Rico per education group**



## Migration from the US to Puerto Rico per education group



### **Overview**

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## **Consequences for natives**

### Effect of low-skilled migration

Suppose that there are 2 types of labor: skilled and unskilled

- Native population size:  $N = N_u + N_s$
- Larger wages for skilled workers:  $w_s > w_u$

#### An inflow of **unskilled immigrants** would:

- $\rightarrow$  Increase the supply of low-skilled workers  $N_u$
- $\rightarrow$  Decrease the wage of low-skilled workers  $w_u$

$$\rightarrow$$
 Decrease average wage  $\frac{N_u w_u + N_s w_s}{N}$ 









### **Alternative scenarios**

There could be adjustments on the firms' side

#### Change in the production mix

- Increase in immigrant-labor intensive industries
- Decrease in other industries
- Adjustments through importations/exportations

#### Adoption of new technology

- Same production mix
- Change in the input (factor) shares

### **Case study: Mariel Boatlift**



## **Historical context**

Late 70s Several attempts by Cubans to seek asylum at the embassies of South American countries to escape Fidel Castro's authoritarian regime

1980 Castro announced that anyone who wanted to leave could leave from the port of Mariel

April 20 Announcement

April 25 Already more than 15,000 refugees in Florida

May 6 US President Jimmy Carter allowed all refugees from Cuba to receive a temporary legal status

### Number of Cubans migrating to the US

![](_page_48_Figure_1.jpeg)

### Who were the Marielitos?

High proportion of **less-skilled individuals**:

- 56-60% high-school dropouts
- 7-10% college graduates
- Likely low English proficiency

#### High proportion of **young and male individuals**:

- 39% 16-30 year-olds
- 38% females, 16% 19-25 year-olds

#### 60-63% still lived in Miami in 1990

### **Immediate consequences**

#### $\approx$ 120 to 125,000 Cubans fled to the US. In Miami:

- $\nearrow$  8% in labor supply
- $\nearrow$  18 20% %HS dropouts in the labor force
- Classical economic theory would predict a decrease in wages and/or an increase in unemployment
  - $\rightarrow~$  Fear that Cubans would "steal" low-skill natives' jobs
  - $\rightarrow$  Important background factor of the mid-May 3-day riot that occurred in several black neighborhoods (13 deaths)

# Early estimation: Card (1990)

#### Data: 1979-1985 March CPS data

- Cubans separately identified from Hispanics
- 1,200 respondents/month throughout the US
- Only one pre-shock year

#### Sample selection:

- Individuals aged 16-61
- Several focus groups
  - ightarrow (Non-Cuban) lowest skill quartile
  - $\rightarrow$  Blacks
  - $\rightarrow$  Cuban

### **Counterfactual estimation**

How would wages in Miami have evolved absent the shock?

Card (1990) seeks cities similar to Miami in terms of:

- % Blacks and Hispanics
- Employment growth trends

### **Chosen cities:**

- Atlanta
- Los Angeles
- Houston
- Tampa-St-Petersburg

"[E]conomic conditions were very similar in Miami and the average of the four comparison cities between 1976 and 1984"

## Differences in Cuban wages Miami vs. comparison cities

![](_page_53_Figure_1.jpeg)

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# Borjas (2017)'s reappraisal

Critique of Card (1990)'s approach

#### Sample selection:

- Should focus specifically on high-school dropouts
- Exclude 16-18 y.o.
  - ightarrow Those still in school would be misclassified as dropouts

#### Methodological approach:

- Non-transparent selection of cities
- Should not base counterfactual on years post-shock!
- Include several years pre-shock

### Log wage of high-school dropouts over college graduates

![](_page_55_Figure_1.jpeg)

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## Synthetic control approach

Problem: No city or group of city exactly comparable to Miami

- Some are close in terms of minority share
- Some are close in terms of employment growth

#### Solution: Use a weighted combination of untreated cities

- 1. Compute a weight vector minimizing distance to Miami's
  - ightarrow Overall employment growth
  - $\rightarrow~{\rm Employment}$  growth of high school dropouts
  - ightarrow Wage growth of high school dropouts
- 2. Fitted on years pre-shock only!
- 3. Apply weights to untreated municipalities' outcome

### Log wage of high-school dropouts over college graduates

![](_page_57_Figure_1.jpeg)

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# Peri and Yasenov (2019)'s reappraisal of the reappraisal

### Target population should include:

- Females
- Non-Cuban Hispanics
- Whole working-age population 19-65

Data: May-ORG CPS instead of March CPS:

March CPS: Annual wage in previous year

 $\rightarrow~\textit{Recalling}~\textit{issues}$ 

 $\rightarrow$  Must be divided by number of weeks worked past year May-ORG: Wage in previous week

 $\rightarrow~$  More reliable and directly usable

### Sensitivity of Borjas (2008)'s results

![](_page_59_Figure_1.jpeg)

# Peri and Yasenov (2019)'s synthetic control results

#### Panel A: Log Weekly Wages

![](_page_60_Figure_2.jpeg)

### In the end...

![](_page_61_Figure_1.jpeg)

### **Overview**

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### Consequences for migrants themselves

## Downgrading

#### Definition

The condition of working **in a job**, or being **paid**, **below** where one would be assigned based on **their skills** 

ightarrow Often faced by immigrants upon arrival

#### **Potential causes**

Partially transferrable skills

 $\rightarrow\,$  For an MD, prevalence of  $\neq$  diseases in destination country Lack of complementary skills

 $\rightarrow\,$  Language proficiency required to make skill productive

### Measurement of downgrading (Dustmann et al., 2013)

#### 1. Estimate the **returns to skills** on the **native** population

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 age_i + \beta_2 education_i + \varepsilon_i$$

2. Compute **expected earnings of immigrants** based on natives' returns to skills

$$\hat{\pmb{y}}_{\pmb{i}} = \hat{lpha} + \hat{eta}_{1} \mathsf{age}_{\pmb{i}} + \hat{eta}_{2} \mathsf{education}_{\pmb{i}}$$

3. **Compare actual vs. expected** earnings for immigrants in the native distribution

![](_page_66_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_67_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_68_Figure_1.jpeg)

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![](_page_69_Figure_1.jpeg)

# Economic integration in the UK (Dustmann et al., 2013)

![](_page_70_Figure_1.jpeg)

### Economic integration in the UK (Dustmann et al., 2013)

![](_page_71_Figure_1.jpeg)
## Economic integration in the UK (Dustmann et al., 2013)



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## **Economic integration: Potential issues**

**Can we attribute the difference** in economic outcomes between immigrants arrived recently vs. a long time ago **to integration?** 

#### Potential sources of bias:

- Survivor bias
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Those who did not manage to integrate left, skewing the results
- At a given point in time those arrived 2 vs. 10 years ago arrived at different times
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Secular trend in the skill composition of immigrants?
  - $\rightarrow~$  Secular trend in exchange rate  $\Rightarrow \Delta$  reservation wage

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#### **Consequences for their children**

## The next generation

Processes regarding the **first generation**:

- 1. Selection to out-migration
- 2. Downgrading
- 3. Integration

#### What happens to children of immigrants?

- Parents may migrate w/ their children's prospects in mind:
  - $\rightarrow~\mbox{Positive selection}$  and high parental involvement
  - $\rightarrow~\mbox{Transmission}$  of values and specific skills
- Children of immigrants typically face many challenges:
  - $\rightarrow\,$  Residential segregation and poorer school quality
  - $\rightarrow~$  Discrimination on the labor market

# Intergenerational mobility of the 2<sup>nd</sup> generation

# Boustan et al. (2025): Collaboration of 38 researcher from 15 countries

#### Use of **administrative data** to obtain:

- Position of native and immigrant in the income distribution
- Position of their children in the income distribution

#### Harmonization of the process at every step:

- Definition of income (individual vs. household, sum vs. average, sources of income considered, ages at income measurement, ...)
- Definition of immigrants (country of birth of the father)
- Birth cohorts

#### **Intergenerational patterns**



#### Sons



## **Daughters**



## **Alternative representation**



Wrap up

## Wrap up

#### Orders of magnitude:

- Most migration flows occur within continents
- $\approx$ 10-15% immigrants in Western countries (3% worldwide)

#### Drivers of migration:

- Push (conflicts, disasters) & pull factors (economic, family)
- Steeper returns to skills  $\rightarrow$  more skilled in-migration

#### **Consequences on locals:**

- Simple theory predicts negative on substitute workers
- Empirically unclear (Mariel boatlift)

## Wrap up

#### Consequences for migrants themselves:

- Initial downgrading
- Socio-economic integration over time

#### **Consequences for their children:**

- Partial convergence for the second generation
- Greater catch-up among daughters

#### Slides available on my website: www.louissirugue.com/teaching

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## Migration flows between continents **Deck**

	Africa	Asia	Europe	Latin Am.	North. Am.	Oceania
Africa	9	2	4	<1	1	<1
Asia	<1	26	7	<1	7	2
Europe	<1	2	16	<1	2	1
Latin Am.	<1	<1	2	5	10	<1
North. Am.	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1
Oceania	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1	<1

## Top 10 origin countries **back**



## Top 10 destination countries (back)

